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Abstract—Anomaly detection tools play a role of paramount
importance in protecting networks and systems from unforeseen
attacks, usually by automatically recognizing and filtering out
anomalous activities. Over the years, different approaches have
been designed, all focused on lowering the false positive rate.
However, no proposal has addressed attacks targeting blockchain-
based systems. In this paper we present BAD: the first Blockchain
Anomaly Detection solution. BAD leverages blockchain meta-
data, named forks, in order to collect potentially malicious
activities in the network/system.
BAD enjoys the following features: (i) it is distributed (thus
avoiding any central point of failure), (ii) it is tamper-proof
(making not possible for a malicious software to remove or to
alter its own traces), (iii) it is trusted (any behavioral data is
collected and verified by the majority of the network) and (iv) it is
private (avoiding any third party to collect/analyze/store sensitive
information). Our proposal is validated via both experimental
results and theoretical complexity analysis, that highlight the
quality and viability of our Blockchain Anomaly Detection
solution.
Index Terms—Blockchain technology, Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems, Distributed Systems
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) digital revolution has brought
a wide range of smart devices in the global market that are
remotely accessible via Internet and able to communicate and
cooperate with each other. This opens great opportunities from
an application and service point of view, but it also creates
new security challenges as devices are easily accessible from
Internet1.
To solve this situation, intrusion detection systems (IDS)
have been developed in the past as tools aimed at strengthening
the security of complex networks and systems via capturing,
monitoring, and analyzing the peers’ traffic or, more in general,
their behavior [1]. These approaches, usually based on log
analysis and data correlation, aim at building attack models
and mitigation strategies on top of them. Existing IDS can be
classified based on their approach to two classes: signature
recognition or anomaly behavior [2]. On one hand, the first
class leverages databases where signatures of well-known
attacks are matched. This database is then used as a reference
model to detect future occurrences of such attacks. Hence,
this approach is not able to recognize new attacks whose
signatures are still unknown. On the other hand, anomaly
detection approaches build models of normal behavior and rise
alerts for deviations from such baselines.
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016 Dyn cyberattack
Thus, the goal of an anomaly detection system (ADS) is to
build the normal behavior model and then to challenge it with
new/unknown behaviors in order to analyze how much they
are close to the reference model.
IDS and ADS proved their functionalities so far, especially
when based on trusted third parties that are responsible to
build reference model and to alert end-users or end-devices if
an unexpected behavior has been detected. We can consider
the classic case of anti-virus companies that build and manage
threat databases, which are then used to identify known threats
or to predict zero days attack. However, this approach does not
work for truly distributed peer-to-peer communities that lack
trusted anchors or centralized management as in blockchain-
based applications. Firstly designed as a support tool for
Bitcoin [3], the blockchain technology allows untrusted peers
within open (i.e. permission-less) communities to agree on
the status of a shared database, without the necessity to
access trusted third parties. The only assumption is that, the
majority of involved peers is honest and willing to keep the
application up and running against malicious users. However,
has shown in real life applications, attackers can eclipse their
victims (i.e. manipulate honest nodes access to the mainstream
global blockchain) thus reducing the number of honest peers
participating in the overall blockchain network. Eclipsing a
node allows or simplifies several types of attacks as shown in
[4], [5].
In this paper we propose BAD: the first Blockchain
Anomaly Detection solution that allows peers in a blockchain
network to be protected against eclipse attacks by sharing in-
formation on previous attacks (i.e. by re-distributing malicious
forks to the whole peer-to-peer community).
To the best of our knowledge, our approach is the first one
that leverages forks on a global scale to detect and prevent
local threats. The idea behind BAD is to collect local attack
logs in the form of (hashed) malicious transactions. These logs
are generated by BAD because of an attack sequence injected
by an attacker on isolated victims, and they are later reused
to prevent similar attacks on uncorrupted nodes.
More precisely, the attack logs (usually discarded in stan-
dard blockchain applications) populate a threat database that
allows other potential victims to be resilient against zero-day
attacks already discovered.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section II the
blockchain background technology is introduced as well as
previous works on anomaly detection systems. Section III
describes our threat model. Sections IV and V introduce
respectively our solution and the related experimental results.
In Section VI we discuss the empirical overhead analysis of
BAD as well as its theoretical complexity, while Section VII
addresses issues and limitations of our system. Finally, Section
VIII concludes the paper and introduces future work.
II. TECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In the rest of this paper we adopt the same notation used in
[6] to describe blockchain and, in general, state replication
distributed protocols. We will only consider permissionless
blockchain technologies, where a race among peers is es-
tablished for mining blocks and rising potential forks (see
NPCcoin2, Litecoin3 and Dash4 which are the cryptocurrencies
with higher market capitalization5). We give some definitions
from [6] below.
An output is a tuple consisting of an amount of bitcoins
and a spending condition. The latter is usually a valid signature
associated with the private key of the spender address, however
it can be generally a script which could be exploited by an
attacker.
An input is a tuple consisting of a reference to a previously
created output and arguments for the spending condition. This
allows the transaction creator has the permission to spend the
referenced output. We call UTXO the set of unspent transaction
outputs.
Definition 1. [6] A transaction is a data structure that de-
scribes the transfer of bitcoins from spender to recipients. The
transaction consists of a number of inputs and new outputs.
The former result in the referenced output spent (removed from
the UTXO), and the latter being added to the UTXO.
Definition 2. [6] A block consists of a transactions’ list,
a reference to the previous block and a nonce. Each block
contains those transactions that the block creator (called the
miner) has accepted in its memory-pool since the previous
block.
In the remaining of this section we give a brief review of
standard ADS and of how a blockchain system works. We
refer the reader to [6] for a formal treatment of the blockchain
topic.
A. Blockchain Technology
A blockchain based solution can be generally seen as a
distributed ledger which is maintained by all the peers within
a peer-to-peer network. The blockchain stores all the trans-
actions that have ever occurred in the network by grouping
them together within blocks and by distributing them via a
broadcast protocol. Transactions contain digital assets (such
as coins in Bitcoin) which are sent directly from a sender to a
receiver without the need of any trusted third party (i.e. banks
in cryptocurrencies).
2https://chainz.cryptoid.info/npc/orphans.dws
3https://chainz.cryptoid.info/ltc/orphans.dws
4https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/orphans.dws
5https://chainz.cryptoid.info/#trading-warning
From a data structure perspective, the blockchain can be
represented by a public and chronologically ordered list of
blocks. Each block contains a list requests known as trans-
actions. Peers willing to participate in the creation of new
blocks (commonly known as miners in Bitcoin) compete to
add a new block to the blockchain thus imposing their view
of the ordered list. In order to prove that their block is the
correct one, miners are required to provide a solution to
a cryptographic problem (nonce), which makes it unlikely
to be solved simultaneously by different peers. However,
contemporary block creations can happen, thus causing chains’
forks. The result is then to have different peers which are
mining on distinct chains. Indeed, due to the longest chain
rule, miners can only work on one single blockchain and, in
order to avoid waste of computational power, the blockchain
to be selected is always the longest one [7]. Blocks on shorter
chains are named orphans and are eventually discarded in the
standard implementation.
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Fig. 1. Example of malicious code embedded within orphaned blocks
B. Anomaly Detection Systems
By recognizing and then discarding, sanitizing, or otherwise
nullifying outliers input that might exploit security vulner-
abilities, ADS often play a central role in many computer
security systems [8]. Formally, an ADS can be defined as a
couple (M,D), where M is the reference model describing
the expected behavior while D is a similarity measure which
specifies the actual behavior’s deviation from M. Over the
years, different ADS approaches have been proposed.
In statistical methods for anomaly detection, the system
observes subjects’ activities and generates different profile
baselines to represent their behavior. Haystack was one of
the earliest examples of statistical based ADS [9] which
used a range of values that were considered normal and
used to detect intrusions. Machine learning based prediction
tools can be used to guess the next expected values; thus,
they can be used in ADS to build the reference model by
predicting normal incoming events, given the current ones. It
is then possible to detect anomalies by selecting those next
events which are not the ones anticipated by the prediction
tools [10], [11], [12]. Machine learning approaches study
algorithms that allow systems to derive general behaviors from
data, and which can be either supervised or unsupervised.
The first model is created from known clean data while
the second is constantly analyzing data and modifying the
behavior model without owning a previous model. As an
example, Spectrogram is a machine learning based statistical
ADS for defense against web-layer code-injection attacks as
a network situated sensor that dynamically assembles packets
to reconstruct content flows and learns to recognize legitimate
web-layer script input [13]. Taint-based techniques have been
analyzed in ADS to avoid the false positives common issue.
However, their applicability is limited by the need for accurate
policies on the use of tainted data. Cavallaro et al. developed a
solution which proved to be capable of detecting attack types
that have been problematic for taint-based techniques, while
significantly cutting down the false positive rate [14].
C. ADS Challenges
ADS usually need to protect the reference model used to
detect known and unknown threats [15], [16]. In host-based
ADS (H-ADS) this database is stored locally while in network-
based ADS (N-ADS) it can be either centralized on a trusted
third party or distributed among the peers.
The problem of having centralized data-storage and manage-
ment systems which are susceptible to breaches becomes even
worse in truly distributed networks such as the ones leveraging
the blockchain technology [17]. Furthermore, although the
blockchain technology prevents several types of unexpected
behaviors from malicious or compromised peers on a global
scale, it does not eliminate attacks on a local scale. Indeed,
local malfunctioning of the blockchain (see Section III) are
discarded and cannot be used by others to recognize attack
sequences that get repeated over time.
As a result, ADS tools aimed at protecting blockchain-based
systems cannot solely rely on information appearing within
the mainstream chain but also need to take into account local
contexts, and to share such information on a global scale.
III. THREAT MODEL
The solution that we propose in this paper has been designed
to be resilient against any class of attacks where a malicious
entity can append its own transactions within the blockchain
in order to inject malicious code in the system. However, for
the sake of simplicity and clarity, we will use the well-known
eclipse attack [4], [5] to provide an example of these attacks,
and how our solution counters them.
Definition 3. A fake transaction is a blockchain transaction
used as a side channel to deliver an unexpected message.
Definition 4. A malicious transaction is a special kind of fake
transaction in which the hidden message has the main purpose
of attacking on or more peers within the network.
Definition 5. A fake block is a blockchain block that contains
one or more fake/malicious transactions. Fake blocks can
be either eventually discarded or accepted as part of the
mainstream chain.
The standard blockchain network (used for Bitcoin) has
been designed to be decentralized and independent of any
public key infrastructure. Indeed, each node connects to 8
other nodes given in a list that is obtained by querying DNS
seeders. In an eclipse attack, the attacker infects a node’s list of
IP addresses, thus forcing the victim’s node in connecting to IP
addresses controlled by the attacker. Furthermore, the attacker
also aims at filtering and manipulating victim’s incoming
connections.
One way to execute an eclipse attack, is to repeatedly
and rapidly forming unsolicited incoming connections to the
victim by attacker’s controlled IP addresses and then to wait
until the victim restarts [18]. Hence, one challenge for the
attacker is to control enough number of IP addresses in
order to increase the probability that all the victim’s outgoing
connections will be directed to IP addresses controlled by him
(see Section V). Once the attacker has monopolized all the
victim’s connections, he can filter incoming blocks and sends
his own fake blocks containing either malicious transactions
as it has been done in ZombieCoin [19] (see Fig. 1). For
the above attack to succeed, we assume the following attack
capabilities:
• Network Control: the attacker can manipulate victims’
connections in order to control their inbound and out-
bound traffic thus being able to isolate them. This is a
standard requirement for the eclipse attack;
• Blockchain Control: the attacker is capable of creating
fake blocks which are sent to the victim. Their content
is forged ad hoc by the attacker and usually contains a
malicious payload.
a) Liveness of the system.: As described in Section V-A,
in this paper we assume to have one or multiple powerful
attackers who are able to perform eclipse attacks on one
or several victims. However, they have to be run in finite
time windows. This means that we always assume that the
victim(s) will eventually: i) recognize a fork, ii) synchronize
with the mainstream blockchain technology and iii) share all
the information collected during the eclipse attack with other
peers in the network.
BH
FH
FH
...
mainstream blockchain enhanced blockchain (Chain DB)
A B C
B
A-B-C recognized as an attack C not accepted after A-B
FH
FH
A B
Fig. 2. An overview of BAD being used as a tool to avoid known blockchain-
based attacks to be repeated over time
IV. BAD: A BLOCKCHAIN ANOMALY DETECTION
SOLUTION
The core idea behind our Blockchain Anomaly Detection
(BAD) consists in providing a new decentralized system
based on the blockchain technology which leverages all the
information collected from past forks. In blockchain-based
applications, forks become more important as the chances to
create their evolution for malicious purposes get higher. The
main reason behind this is that while attacks may happen only
once within a single device, when they are repeated over time
against other devices they usually keep behaving in the same
way. Hence, by collecting information on previous attacks it
could be possible to black list them and to prevent them even
within peers that have not been attacked yet.
In our solution, information about orphaned blocks and
forks in general are not discarded (as usually done by other
blockchain-based applications. Such information is rather col-
lected, enriched and then shared with the other peers in the
network. Among all the other information, what is recorded
is: i) the time at which the fork has started, ii) the time at
which the fork has been detected, and iii) the number and
type of malicious transactions (if any). Fig. 2 shows a snippet
of what is detected. The longer chain in the middle is the
mainstream blockchain (eventually agreed by all the peers).
All the other shorter blockchain branches represent forks that
happened in the past with fork head (FH) being the last blocks
accepted before the detection of the fork. Last but not least, as
a toy example, Fig. 2 also depicts some malicious transactions
labeled as A, B, and C that, as explained in Section III, can
be either fake transactions or valid transaction embedding
malicious code.
The collection of all the fork-related information and the
construction of an enhanced blockchain as the one depicted in
Fig. 2 made us able to design BAD as an ADS for blockchain-
based applications. In fact, if this enhanced blockchain is
eventually agreed by all the peers as already done for the
mainstream blockchain, to build our ADS we had just to
redefine the couple (M,D) introduced in Section II-B. In
BAD, M will be represented by the mainstream blockchain
thus describing the expected behavior while all the D will be
represented by the forks thus describing similarity measures
and their deviation from M. It is then possible to learn that,
as shown in Fig. 2, A-B-C have been previously labeled as
an attack thus preventing them to be re-executed on different
peers.
Note that our solution is particularly efficient when the
attacker replicates the same malicious transactions at each
attack. However, for a more general case we need an additional
layer (for instance provided by machine learning or similarity
measurement tools) where a sequence of suspicious trans-
actions can be compared with a set of malicious sequences
(collected overtime by BAD), in order to be identified as an
attack and eventually prevented.
A. Application Stack
The standard blockchain application stack is structured in
three layers: shared data, shared protocol and application.
Shared Data Layer: contains the core blockchain and
its overlay network. It is still based on the core blockchain
protocol but it is used to build networks (called sidechains
[20]) that work in parallel to the Bitcoin blockchain (or to other
blockchain-based applications) to perform tasks that Bitcoin
cannot solve while still relaying on the same blockchain data
structures. Whatever forms this overlay networks take, they
all share the connection to the Bitcoin blockchain (or any
other blockchain). Such a connection is used to bootstrap their
own alternative solution by leveraging the Bitcoin peer-to-peer
network;
Shared Protocol Layer: thanks to the blockchain it is now
possible to develop decentralized applications with built-in
data (transaction payload), validation processes, and transac-
tions that are not controlled by any single entity;
Application Layer: applications built on top of the shared
data layer and the shared protocol layer work very similarly
to the ones we have nowadays. However, they inherit security,
privacy and decentralization properties from the underlying
blockchain technology. Hence, peers using these applications
will be able to talk with each other and finally reach an
agreement which is trusted even though no central authority
has been used.
BAD has been designed to be an ad hoc solution (i.e. a
blockchain based application plug-in or a third party service)
rather than to be embedded within Bitcoin or any other specific
application. The reason for such approach is that BAD does
not rely on a specific blockchain and can be set up to detect
attacks on any blockchain application. Indeed, the core Bitcoin
elements such as the wallet and the miner do not contain BAD
elements but just interact with them. Here, we describe each
BAD’s module and how it interacts with standard blockchain
application:
• Transaction Filter (Tx Filter): this module intercepts
standard blockchain messages and forward them to both
the miner and the chain manager, thus not interrupting
the standard blockchain protocol. Furthermore, it allows
the collection of transactions meta-data;
• Chain Manager: it is responsible to build our enhanced
blockchain which, among the other elements, contains
information on the forks that have been generated so
far. It receives messages from the transaction filter and
retrieves additional missing information from the chain
database which finally stores our enhanced blockchains
(i.e. blockchains built starting from the mainstream chain
but with additional information on forks, see Fig. 2 for an
example). Last but not least, the chain manager notifies
the pattern inspector if the enhanced blockchain has been
updated and some threat analysis has to be done;
• Pattern Inspector: leverages the chain database to detect
unexpected behaviors. The inspection on the forks can
be done with any approach ranging from signatures to
heuristic static analysis and is aimed at finding sequences
of transactions which were found to be dangerous in the
past;
• Threat Detector: starting from the anomalies found by
the pattern inspector this module performs root-cause
analysis by exploiting past blockchain activities (past
blocks and transactions within them) to roll back all the
operations done by the victim. Afterwards, all the attack
information are collected within a threat database which
contains the information on all the malicious patterns
within the blockchain that have to be considered mali-
cious (depending on the security policy being adopted).
Fig. 3 shows a simple implementation of BAD’s threat
database. Here, recalling the toy example given in Fig. 2
in which three blocks (A,B and C) were found to contain
malicious code, we show how this information is collected
and later shared with other peers. BAD’s threat database is
basically a dynamic (i.e. not sized) array of array in which Si
represents the i-th attack sequence detected while Ti represents
the hash of the i-th transaction which was found to contain part
of the payload’s attack sequence.
Information used to fill the threat database is provided by
the pattern inspector and used by the transaction filter to
avoid the repeating of known attacks. The filtering process is
accomplished by the BAD’s transaction filter module each time
a new block is received and its overhead has been analyzed
in Section VI-B.
Fig. 3. Implementation of the threat database in BAD
V. EXPERIMENTAL TEST
In this section we show how BAD has been used in
our experimental platform to prevent attacks across different
networks thanks to the information collected from forks. The
goal of this experiment has been to detect forks on a given
peer that were caused by an eclipse attack and then to share
this information with other peers in order to build a reference
model aimed at detecting future occurrences of the same
attack.
A. Test Bed
For the sake of simplicity and clarity, we describe here a toy
environment which has been deployed and run over our real
systems. Such environment is composed by two domains, A
and B, that represent two separated private IP networks with
a router between them. In domain A (B respectively), we have
deployed two full nodes and one lightweight client. On the
one hand, the two full nodes6 A1 (B1 in B) and A3 (B3 in B)
6https://bitcoin.org/en/full-node#what-is-a-full-node
have been executed each on a Virtual Machine with 4 GB of
RAM and Linux Ubuntu 16.04. Both have been executed in
regtest experimental mode7 (a mode in which local testing
environment can be created with instantaneous on-demand
block generations and digital assets creation without any real
value). A3 (B3 in B) is controlled by a malicious user. On
the other hand, for the wallet we have used a Bitcoin Java
BitcoinJ client (version 0.14.3)8 running on a 4GB RAM PC
with Windows 8.1 installed. This wallet acts as the victim
in the eclipse attack and is labeled as A2 (B2 in B). A1
(B1 in B) and A3 (B3 in B) are connected to each other,
which means they can exchange blocks between them and
agree on the longest chain (to do so we used on each node
the following command: bitcoin-cli -regtest addnode
IPaddressoftheothernode add). Nodes in domains A and
B are initially synchronized on the same blockchain (this
block chain is generated using the command bitcoin-cli
-regtest generate X9).
B. Attack Detection and Prevention
Our attack consists of eclipsing A2 and forcing it
to only communicate with A3 which is controlled by
the attacker. Furthermore, A3 does not exchange any
block with A1 to avoid being detected by other nodes
in the same domain (to do so we used the following
command on node A3: bitcoin-cli -regtest addnode
IPaddressofA1 remove). Then A3 sends to A2 three new
blocks which contain fake or malicious transactions ( to do
so, we have used the command: bitcoin-cli -regtest
generate 3) and that get accepted by A2 as connected to the
previous blockchain header and as representing the longest
chain. Assuming that the three new blocks created by A3
contained a malicious payload, at this point we have A2 that
has been attacked. After the attack and once the eclipse is
removed and all the connections re-established, A2 receives
a longer chain from peers within the domain A and accepts
it but without discarding the information of those three ma-
licious blocks. Furthermore, the information regarding those
potentially malicious blocks are sent in broadcast thus reaching
other peers (in our toy example represented by the node B2).
As a second step we execute the same eclipse attack in the
domain B. However this time we have leveraged BAD and
the information gathered so far (sent to B2 by A2) to prevent
the attack from succeed again. Hence, we first eclipse B2 by
forcing it to only connect to B3 that is actually controlled by a
malicious user. At this point, as previously done in domain A,
B3 generates three malicious blocks which contains, among the
others, the same three malicious transactions used in the attack
against A3. However, unlike A3, B3 has now BAD which is
running and checking for the upcoming transactions. As also
shown in Fig. 2, BAD detects blocks that are different but
containing the same transactions (or a subset) in the same
order. The final result is then the prevention of the complete
7https://bitcoin.org/en/developer-examples#regtest-mode
8https://bitcoinj.github.io
9to create X blocks in the blockchain
attack as only a small subset of the malicious transactions
is accepted (in our example by A2) before BAD recognizes
them as malicious. As done by A2, also B2 will share the
information with other peers once it realizes that it was
previously mining and elaborating on blocks that belong to
a fork.
VI. OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
The core elements introduced by BAD on the classical
Bitcoin protocol are the broadcast of brand new forks, and
their orphaned blocks, as well as the detection of malicious
transactions on new received blocks. In this section, we
analyze the introduced bandwidth overhead to show that our
solution is scalable and thus deployable within the standard
Bitcoin network. In particular, the results of our analysis
show that our system has minimal bandwidth consumption
in comparison with the one consumed by standard nodes.
A. Bandwidth overhead
We have analyzed the overhead introduced by our solution
in the worst-case scenario, i.e. the whole global Bitcoin fork
activity to affect one single node named NX. Our overhead is
then defined as the amount of bandwidth that NX consumes
due to the fork broadcast introduced in BAD. To this aim, and
to be rooted on real data, we have considered the maximum
number of orphaned blocks discarded by the Bitcoin commu-
nity during last year. We are interested in the total number of
orphaned blocks because it includes those used to attack the
victims (see Section III). Furthermore, we assume this number
to have a small variance since a smart adversary, to stay
hidden in the network, would not create an anomalous number
of orphaned blocks. A more abstract, and less constrained,
analysis is given in Section VI-B.
To analyze BAD’s overhead, we have then designed the p2p
network surrounding our NX node. By construction, nodes
in the Bitcoin network create a random graph—randomness
being due to the selection of outgoing connections. In the
vanilla Bitcoin protocol, each node attempts to keep a mini-
mum of 8 outgoing connections at all time. However, it has
been observed that, on average, a Bitcoin node has 32 outgoing
connections [21]. Furthermore, the total number of orphaned
blocks discarded during last year (2016)10 was 141 with a
maximum block size of 0.993201 MB. As such, in our worst-
case scenario, we consider all those 141 orphaned blocks
(of the maximum size) to be collected and re-distributed in
broadcast by NX. To broadcast all these blocks with their trans-
actions, NX would send broadcast messages to its neighbors,
which sum up to the global size of 32× 0.993201× 141 =
4.481 GB per year. It is important to highlight that the total
number of orphaned blocks is independent of the node’s
bandwidth. Hence, our worst-case scenario can be applied
to any node: from lightweight SVP clients to relay nodes or
miners. Furthermore, the total node/month upload bandwidth
could vary according to nodes capabilities and ISP resources,
10https://blockchain.info/charts/n-orphaned-blocks
it could start with 150 GB/month (which is the minimum
recommended upload bandwidth to run a Bitcoin core 11) and
reach values up to 300 GB/month and more.
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Fig. 4. Overhead introduced by the system as a function of the bandwidth
consumption of a node
Fig. 4 plots the result of our BAD’s overhead analysis which
is approximated by the following formula:
Ovh=
BAD data broadcast (per year)
total data exchanged (per year)
=
4.481
m× 12
(1)
where m is the average bandwidth consumption of a node
per month. Fig. 4 shows the maximum overhead introduced in
the case of 150 GB of upload bandwidth consumption which is
of 0.248%. The results is an overhead on the bandwidth of only
0.248%. This finally proves BAD to be smoothly deployable
in the standard Bitcoin network.
B. Complexity
In the previous section we have analyzed BAD’s overhead
in the worst case, i.e. with an attacker using Bitcoin’s forks to
spread malicious code. However, statistics and real data used
for such analysis refer to natural forks appeared over time in
the network due to its delay.
Here, we analyze a more general use case, the one in which
the attacker creates as many blocks as needed (thus also gen-
erating more forks in the system). The result, as shown in the
remaining of this section, is that BAD’s bandwidth overhead,
in the worst case, can only by proportional (up to a constant
factor in real cases) to the size k of our Threat Database T . Let
S1, . . . ,Sk be the malicious transaction sequences of k attacks
detected and stored in T . Each sequence Si has a length of
ℓi transactions injected by the attacker to complete attack i.
We call partial sequence (PSi, j) a subsequence of Si starting
from the first transaction and ending with the j-th transaction
of Si. Note that (PSi, ℓi) represents the full attack i. For each i
we can have at most ℓi− 1 incomplete sequences. Each node
in the network maintains a set U of partial transactions. Given
that H(t) is the hash of a transaction t, every time t is analyzed
by a node, BAD performs two actions:
1) If there is a partial sequence (PSi, j) ∈ U such that
(PSi, j)||H(t) = (PSi, j + 1), we replace (PSi, j) with
11 https://bitcoin.org/en/bitcoin-core/features/requirements
(PSi, j+ 1) in U . Here || is the standard concatenation
function.
2) If H(t) represents the first block of a sequence Si, then
we insert (PSi,1) into U .
Finally, BAD checks if there is a (PSi, ℓi) in U and, in that
case, discards the transaction t. While the correctness of this
approach follows from the construction, the analysis requires
some more effort. Note that in the worst case (which is when
every transaction of every attack has the exact same hash),
every transaction will create a new partial sequence (PSi,1),∀i,
plus it will increase at most ℓi− 1 existing partial sequences
in U for each i. This translates in the following number of
steps:
W (t) = k+
k
∑
i=1
(ℓi− 1) =
k
∑
i=1
ℓi
Since (in a real scenario) each attack sequence is no longer
than a constant c of transactions, the total work W (t) for a
given transaction will be at most c · k = O(k) where k = |T |.
In case the size of T grows very quickly, pruning techniques
can be adopted to regulated its dimension. For example, hold
or infrequent attacks could be discarded in favor of the newly
discovered ones.
VII. DISCUSSION
In the standard blockchain implementation (used in Bitcoin),
each victim possesses two tables: tried and new. On the
one hand, the tried table contains 64 buckets each of which
stores 64 IP addresses. These IP addresses refer to known
peers which have successfully established connections with
the victim in the past. On the other hand, the new table
contains 256 buckets each of which stores 64 IP addresses.
These addresses refer to peers with whom the victim has not
yet initiated a successful connection. In blockchain applica-
tions, each peer randomly selects 8 IP addresses (i.e. 8 tried
neighbors) among all the addresses stored in the tried table.
As such, in order to prevent (deterministically) the victim from
sending in broadcast the fork information collected during the
attack, the attacker has to eclipse either all the 4096 peers
contained in the tried table or the 8 peers which are randomly
selected. This is a very complex attack since, in order to
eclipse the victim’s tried neighbors, the attacker must have
access to the victim’s tried table. This access can be obtained
either by compromising the victim’s device or by monitoring
the network and eavesdropping the victim’s connections and
behavior.
It is also important to highlight that the block propaga-
tion time is approximately in the interval [0s . . . 60s] with
the percentage of nodes not receiving this block decreasing
exponentially when time increases [21]. Hence, once the tried
neighbors IP addresses have been identified, the attacker has to
succeed in the eclipse attack within 60 seconds. This demands
strong processing power if the attacker is able to control 50%
of the addresses in the victim’s tried table with a probability
to eclipse the victim in 1 hour time investment close to zero.
The above two considerations, together with the fact that
the tried and new tables are dynamically updated over time,
make a total eclipse of the victim’s surrounding network very
unlikely to happen. However, this only relates to Bitcoin.
Indeed, other blockchain based applications might use differ-
ent peer-to-peer protocols, mining algorithms and consensus
schemes thus being more exposed to eclipse attacks. For all
these blockchains BAD can play a crucial role in the mitigation
of eclipse attacks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed BAD: the first Blockchain
Anomaly Detection solution. In particular, BAD allows to
detect anomalous transactions and to prevent them from being
further spread. We have provided a thorough description of
BAD, as well as a preliminary validation of its performances
over a toy network and a comprehensive analysis of BAD’s
complexity in the presence of an attacker who can create forks
at will. Next steps are aiming at a fully fledged implementation
of BAD, followed by a comprehensive testing on our internal
corporate network.
An interesting open research question is related to which
machine learning techniques should be included in the BAD
architecture in order to build strong prediction tools for
heterogeneous malicious transactions.
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